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Among various consequences of the subprime
mortgage crisis,which broke out during the summer
of 2007, the burst of unemployment is undoubtedly
the most concerning.The rise in unemployment has
been particularly pronounced in the United States.
While the OECD harmonised unemployment rate
(HUR) had decreased from 6 percent in 2003 to
4.6 percent in 2007, it suddenly climbed to 5.8 per-
cent in 2008 and reached 8.1 percent during the first
quarter of 2009.The evolution is less clear-cut in the
EU, in which the average HUR has changed from
9 percent in 2003 to 8.2 percent in the first quarter
of 2009. But this average hides significant differ-
ences among European countries. Some of them
exhibit a particularly alarming employment situa-
tion, as exemplified by Ireland (with a HUR of
4.8 percent in 2003 against 11.8 percent in 2009)
and Spain (11.1 percent in 2003 compared to
18.1 percent in 2009).
The most direct manifestation of the subprime crisis
for the ‘real’ economy has been the dramatic reduc-
tion in access to credit faced by households and,
above all, by firms. The credit crunch mainly results
from both liquidity shrinkage and failures in the
banking system. On the one hand, distressed banks
tend to squeeze credit in order to restore their liq-
uidity.On the other hand,banks’ failures destroy the
long-term relationships that lenders and borrowers
have been building for many years (Bernanke 1983).
As bank information about borrowers is inherently
private, firms face difficulties in getting credit from
other lenders. This leads to a reduction of credit
availability, which can be amplified by a decline of
share prices in financial markets. For example, firms
with credit lines from the Continental Illinois
incurred a significant fall in their share’s value just
after the bank’s collapse in 1984 (Slovin et al. 1993).
When the crisis is systemic, the whole stock market
is affected, as testified by the decline in all major
stock indexes since 2008.
The credit squeeze induced by the subprime crisis
raises the more general point of the link between
credit and labour market performance. The aim of
this paper is to examine this issue and its normative
implications. Following this introduction, we analyse
the relationship between firms’ access to credit and
unemployment in the second section. The third sec-
tion is dedicated to the literature on institutional and
legal determinants of the access to credit. In the
fourth section, we both complete and moderate the
view developed in the second section, stressing the
complex interactions that exist between financial
arrangements and labour market institutions. The
final section concludes.
Access to finance and unemployment: theoretical
and empirical arguments
The links between access to credit and unemploy-
ment have been widely studied in the theoretical
and empirical literature. To start with, there exists
an indirect transmission channel that relates to the
financial determinants of capital demand and the
sensitivity of investment to cash-flow. In the new-
Keynesian view, information asymmetries between
lender and borrowers are analysed as market
imperfections that result in credit rationing and
investment contraction (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
Using American firm-level data, Fazzari et al.
(1988) estimate empirical investment models.They
examine whether investment decisions depend on
the availability of internal funds and whether this
sensitivity is higher for high information-asymme-
try firms. They confirm the existence of financial
constraints, especially for low-dividend firms. A
large empirical literature has then developed in
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these studies examines the effect of investment
fluctuations on labour demand and employment
performance.
A second strand of literature deals more explicitly
with the issue of employment.To start with,finance
directly affects employment through its impact on
the new establishment of firms. According to
Acemoglu (2001), job creation mainly occurs in
innovating firms. Reducing the access to credit for
entrepreneurs prevents the emergence of new
firms and penalises employment. Belke and Fehn
(2002), Fehn and Fuchs (2003) and Belke et al.
(2004) focus on venture capital as a particularly
appropriate source of finance for innovating firms.
Their theoretical and empirical studies reveal that
an insufficient development of venture capital hin-
ders the establishment of new firms, thus harming
employment.
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) as well as Arnold
(2002) use an alternative approach,relating the new-
Keynesian literature on capital demand to the issue
of labour demand. They show that firms’ labour
demand depends on their financial constraint and
fluctuates according to their balance-sheet position.
Hence,employment declines when firms face a cred-
it squeeze. This theoretical result has been corrobo-
rated by empirical studies. For example, Sharpe
(1994) finds that the sensitivity of American firms’
labour demand to sales increases with their leverage
ratio. Using a set of British firms, Nickell and
Wadhwani (1991) show that employment decreases
with firms’ leverage ratio and increases with their
market capitalization. Moreover Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1999) conclude that employment falls
with the ratio of interest payments to cash-flow.
Benito and Hernando (2008) obtain the same out-
come for Spanish firms. Using Italian data, Caggese
and Cunat (2008) establish that firms facing stronger
financial constraints resort more intensively to fixed-
term rather than to permanent workers.
Finally, the recent paper by Campello et al. (2010)
proposes an encompassing analysis of how financial
constraints affect both investment and employment.
Their contribution is all the more interesting as they
concentrate on the subprime crisis period. The
authors survey 1,050 chief financial officers in the
United States, Europe and Asia in order to distin-
guish financially-constrained and non financially-
constrained firms.Their study provides evidence that
during the crisis (i.e.during the last quarter of 2008),
American financially-constrained firms were plan-
ning to cut their fixed capital expenses and reduce
employment more intensively than non financially-
constrained firms. Moreover, the difference between
financially and non financially-constrained firms’
reactions is significantly larger during the crisis than
before (i.e. from the third quarter of 2007 to the last
quarter of 2008).
Institutional and legal determinants of the access to
credit
In most countries prudential and credit-boosting
policies have been undertaken in order to bail out
the banking system and to tackle the credit crisis.But
access to credit also has structural determinants such
as the legal and institutional framework.This idea is
at the heart of the so-called ‘law and finance’ view,
developed in the wake of the seminal paper by La
Porta et al. (1997). The main argument propounded
in this literature is that the availability of external
finance strongly depends on the degree of investor
protection as well as on the efficiency of law enforce-
ment. Special attention is devoted to countries’ legal
systems. They distinguish four legal systems: the
English, the French, the German and the Scandina-
vian system. The literature mainly contrasts the
English and the French system. While the former,
which prevails in Anglo-Saxon countries, is based on
Common Law,the latter,in force in France as well as
in many southern European countries, is based on
the French Code Civil. According to this literature,
the English system is more favourable to financial
development and growth than the French one (La
Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al. 1998a; Levine 1998;
Levine 1999; Beck et al. 2000).
In the same line as this literature, Djankov et al.
(2003) and Djankov, Hart et al. (2008) focus on the
access to credit.2 They use several indicators that
depend on the legal system and determine credit
availability. Djankov et al. (2007) concentrate on the
creditor rights index, built by La Porta et al. (1997)
and La Porta et al. (1998a). This indicator encom-
passes several criteria: (a) whether there exist res-
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2 In the same line, some other works concentrate on securities laws
(La Porta et al. 2006) and self-dealing (Djankov, La Porta et al.
2008) as well as on the quality of government (La Porta et al.
1998b) and the legal framework of new firms’ entry (Djankov et al.
2002).CESifo Forum 1/2010 39
Focus
trictions (such as creditor consent or minimum divi-
dends) when a debtor files for reorganization, (b)
whether secured creditors can seize their collateral
after the approval of a reorganization, (c) whether
secured creditors are paid first out of the liquidating
firm (before workers and the government), and
finally (d) whether an administrator (instead of the
manager) runs the business during the reorganiza-
tion.Adding a value of 1 each time one of these four
conditions is fulfilled, one obtains a creditor rights
index that varies between 0 (poor creditor rights)
and 4 (strong creditor rights). Following La Porta et
al. (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998a), Djankov et al.
(2007) find that the Common Law system is associ-
ated with a higher creditor index compared to the
French legal system (2.278 in 2003 for the former
against 1.313 for the latter), suggesting that Anglo-
Saxon countries offer better legal protection to cred-
itors. Using a set of 133 countries in the period from
1978 and 2003, the authors also regress the ratio of
private credit from deposit financial institutions to
the private sector to GDP on several control vari-
ables (such as GDP, GDP per capital growth, infla-
tion, etc.). Their OLS estimates confirm the results
obtained by La Porta et al. (1997) on a shorter data
set (49 countries for the year 1994). The degree of
creditor protection is shown to favour access to cred-
it:when the creditor rights index (measured in 1999)
rises by 1 percent, the ratio of private credit to GDP
increases by 6 percent.
The authors also discuss the role of credit informa-
tion sharing among creditors.Their idea is that infor-
mation sharing alleviates insolvency risk, thus mak-
ing banks less reluctant to grant credit. To measure
the extent of information sharing in each country of
their data set, they use two indicators. The first one
relates to public registries that collect data about
borrowers’ indebtedness and make them available to
lenders. It equals one if there exists a public registry
in the country, zero otherwise. The second indicator
refers to private credit bureaus,which allow banks to
share their information about borrowers. It is equal
to one if there exists a credit bureau in the country,
zero otherwise. Public registries are more widely
established in French-system countries than in
Common Law countries while the reverse holds for
credit bureaus. Using the same econometric method
as for their study of credit rights, Djankov et al.
(2007) find that the presence of private bureaus has
a positive impact on the ratio of private credit while
public registries favour access to credit only in low-
income countries.
Djankov, Hart et al. (2008) examine the efficiency
of debt enforcement as a determinant of access to
credit.Their study is based on a survey of attorneys
and judges in 88 countries, completed in 2005.
Three variables are used to measure debt enforce-
ment: the time to resolve the insolvency process
(taken from Djankov et al. 2003), the cost to com-
plete the insolvency process, and the likely disposi-
tion of assets (whether assets are preserved as a
going concern or sold piecemeal). An encompass-
ing measure of efficiency of debt enforcement is
then computed. The higher it is, the more efficient
is law enforcement. Here again, the English legal
system is shown to offer a higher debt enforcement
efficiency than the French system. The average
index amounts to 72.1 for Common Law countries
while it is only 40.4 for French legal system coun-
tries. The econometric approach of the authors is
the same as in Djankov et al.(2007).They establish
that the efficiency of debt enforcement positively
affects the ratio of private credit to GDP. When
debt enforcement efficiency increases by 10 per-
cent,the ratio rises by 5 or 6 percent,depending on
the econometric specification.
These elements support the view that the institu-
tional environment crucially accounts for access to
credit. They also suggest that the Anglo-Saxon
legal system is the most appropriate from this
point of view. Hence, reforming legal systems in
the direction of a higher creditor protection, a
reduction of the time and the cost of the insolven-
cy process as well as a preservation of corporate
assets should foster credit availability. This is pre-
cisely the kind of policy advocated by the World
Bank. In its annual report ‘Doing Business’, explic-
itly inspired by the ‘law and finance’ literature, the
World Bank proposes a ranking of countries based
on various institutional indicators of doing busi-
ness easiness, some of which especially affecting
access to credit. Table 1 reports the value of these
indicators for selected countries.
The World Bank also lists the countries engaged in
significant reforms of their credit access regulation.
For example, the Doing Business report indicates
that, over the last five years, the main area of reform
from this point of view has been the strengthening of
creditor rights, especially in high-income countries
(among which are Denmark, United States, Finland,
France, etc.).According to the report, these reforms
improved the credit recovery rate. Hence, they
should also increase credit availability. The otherimportant area of reform pointed out by the World
Bank has consisted in increasing the efficiency of the
liquidation process, notably through a reduction of
its duration. This trend has been particularly pro-
nounced in eastern European countries.
It is noteworthy that these policy recommenda-
tions are generally deregulation-oriented. For
example, reducing the liquidation duration and
softening the procedure contribute to make firms’
closure easier. Similarly, promoting the develop-
ment of credit bureaus implies a reduction of
banks’ information monopoly and an increase in
banking competition (Brown et al. 2007). The de-
regulation dimension of reforms advocated by the
World Bank is particularly is confirmed by the
comments of Djankov et al. (2007) on the positive
impact of public credit registries in low-income
countries: “these results [...] point to a beneficial
role of public credit registries in poor French legal
origin countries – a rare example of an apparent-
ly successful state intervention” (Djankov et al.
2007, 301).
Combined with evidence given in the second section,
these arguments suggest that reforming the institu-
tional determinants of credit granting in the way
defined by the ‘law and finance’ literature could sig-
nificantly improve employment performance.
Interactions between credit
availability and labour market
institutions
The aim of this section is to take
a critical look at the view devel-
oped in the previous section.
Our main criticism concerns the
existence of complementarities
or substitutability among vari-
ous institutional arrangements.
Two policies or institutions are
said to be complementary (resp.
substitutable) when the efficien-
cy of the one increases (resp. de-
creases) with the presence or the
implementation of the other.
Recent empirical and theoretical
contributions3 provide rich ana-
lyses of institutional interactions
among labour market institu-
tions (labour legislation, unem-
ployment protection, union den-
sity, wage taxation, etc.) and
product markets institutions (barriers to entry, price
control, etc.).
But there also exist interactions between credit
market regulation and labour market institutions.
The literature on this issue is particularly interesting
because it shows that the links between credit poli-
cies and unemployment are more complex than
exposed in the third section. However, it is limited
to a few theoretical papers.A first category of stud-
ies considers financial deregulation and labour mar-
ket flexibilization as substitutes. In Rendon (2001),
reducing firing and hiring costs boosts employment.
Access to external finance curbs unemployment
since it allows firms to finance labour adjustment
costs.Therefore, if credit is easily available, removal
of labour market adjustment costs becomes less
effective since these costs can easily be financed by
external finance. Symmetrically, if the labour mar-
ket is made perfectly flexible, access to external
finance has a weak impact on employment.In Belke
and Fehn (2002), strong labour protection allows
workers to partly capture the rent resulting from the
entrepreneur’s project. This decreases the project’s
rate of return below the minimum threshold
required by fund providers. Hence, the firm cannot
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a) Measure of the legal rights of borrowers and lenders through collateral
and bankruptcy laws (the higher the index, the stronger the protection). –
b) Measure of the scope, access, and quality of credit information (the
higher the index, the better information). – 
c) Number of individuals and
firms listed in a public credit-registry as a percentage of adult population. –
d) Number of individuals and firms listed in a private credit-registry as a
percentage of adult population 
Source: World Bank (2009).
3 See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003); Griffith et al. (2006); Berger
and Danninger (2007); Fiori et al. (2007); Kugler and Pica (2008);
Amable and Gatti (2006) as well as Amable et al. (2010).CESifo Forum 1/2010 41
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be established and no jobs are created. However,
the rise in unemployment yields a decline in labour
protection and a subsequent rise in the project’s
return above the fund providers’ threshold. Never-
theless, financial constraints slow down this adjust-
ment process so that the return to higher employ-
ment is delayed. Symmetrically, when the labour
market is flexible, there is no unemployment, and
financial deregulation becomes ineffective. When
the financial system is frictionless, the return to
employment is immediate and a deregulation of the
labour market becomes less interesting. According
to these approaches, improving firms’ access to
external finance may not be always effective. If the
labour market is highly deregulated, boosting credit
turns out to be ineffective. However, it can be effec-
tive in countries where labour markets are highly
regulated.
Another series of papers regard financial deregula-
tion and labour market flexibilization as being com-
plementary. Koskela and Stenbacka (2002) model
the effects of a reduction of bank competition in an
economy where workers are remunerated by a bar-
gained base wage and a share of the firms’ profit.
Because the firms’ hiring policy is financed by bor-
rowing, an increase in the interest rate implied by a
reduction of banking competition hinders employ-
ment. But workers internalize the rise in hiring
costs and bargain less harshly about their base
wage. The moderating effect dominates when
unions are powerful. Otherwise, the former effect
prevails. Hence, promoting access to credit through
higher banking competition may be particularly
effective if there is no moderating effect, i.e. if
union density is weak. More generally, this suggests
that financial liberalisation boosts employment
only in countries with weakly deregulated labour
markets. It becomes less interesting if the labour
market is highly regulated.This contradicts the con-
clusion drawn from Rendon (2001), and Belke and
Fehn (2002).
The outcome of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) pro-
vides an even greater contrast. In their model, reg-
ulation of labour markets and financial systems
(rather than deregulation) are seen as complemen-
tary. The authors argue that credit rationing
favours employment since it entices firms to invest
in human capital rather than in physical capital.
The effect of a credit squeeze is particularly posi-
tive when labour market regulation hinders em-
ployment.
In summary, according to the nature of institutional
interactions between labour market and financial
arrangements, promoting firms’ access to credit may
have no effect on employment.This theoretical con-
clusion has important implications for empirical
research.It notably suggests that it is urgently neces-
sary to determine which one out the three configu-
rations prevails in each country: substitutability
between financial deregulation and labour market
flexibilization, complementarity between financial
deregulation and labour market flexibilization or
complementarity between labour market and finan-
cial system regulation.
The paper by Gatti et al. (2009) is precisely aimed at
filling this gap. Using annual data for 18 OECD
countries for the period of 1980 to 2004, they inves-
tigate how labour and financial factors interact to
determine unemployment.They estimate a dynamic
panel model using the system generalized method of
moments (GMM). Enlarging the analysis of access
to credit to the more global issue of external finance,
they consider three types of financial variables:stock
market capitalization, intermediated credit (claims
to the private sector by deposit money banks, insur-
ance companies,private pensions,pooled investment
schemes and development banks) and banking con-
centration.The main conclusion of the paper is that
the impact of financial variables strongly depends on
the labour market context. On the one hand,
increased market capitalization and decreased bank-
ing concentration reduce unemployment only if the
level of labour market regulation, union density and
coordination in wage bargaining is low.On the other
hand, increasing intermediated credit and banking
concentration promote employment when the
degree of labour market regulation, union density
and coordination in wage bargaining is high. These
results have important policy implications: in coun-
tries with high levels of labour market regulation,
union density and wage bargaining coordination,
boosting intermediated finance (through higher
intermediated credit and banking concentration)
appears much more appropriate than promoting
market-based finance (through increased capitaliza-
tion and lower banking concentration).
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to stress the importance of
institutions as critical determinants of the relation-
ships between credit and employment. Its main con-
clusion is that this relationship does not only dependon the legal determinants of credit but also on their
interactions with other institutional arrangements
such as labour market institutions.
We have already emphasised the need for empirical
evaluations of institutional interaction effects. But
there is also much theoretical work to be done. A
particularly important inquiry avenue concerns
accounting for product market institutions. In so far
as they are closely linked to labour market institu-
tions, how do they interact with financial factors?
This calls for an encompassing theoretical model
including not only labour market and financial
arrangements but also product market institutions.
This very hard task undoubtedly constitutes a moti-
vating research agenda.
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